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This study analytically shows that a VER serves as an institution to
protect incumbent firms of an exporting country. A VER is an entry
barrier in the export market. It favours the concentration of industry,
and allows established firms to better exploit economies of scale by
producing output at lower average cost. Since the break-even price for
potential firms is the average cost, entry in the domestic market is also
inhibited, regardless of the form of competition. A VER also allows the
raising of the price cost margin in the export market. However, the
smaller the country, the greater the possibility also of a larger
monopoly power in the domestic market. The impact on firm size is
ambiguous. From the social point of view, three conventional effects
from the elimination of a VER are usually considered: the rent loss
effect, the efficiency effect and the export producer price effect. In this
study, two further effects on welfare are examined: the increased
intermediate inputs cost effect and the variety effect. The global effect
on welfare on an exporting country is analytically indeterminate. A
general equilibrium model applied to Turkey supports the conjecture
that with the elimination of a VER, under Bertrand or Cournot
conjectures, the loss in social welfare, the higher average cost, the fall
of the concentration of the industry, and the fall of monopoly power of
incumbent firms, are the key elements in understanding the rationale
beyond VERs.
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The economic literature on VERs was developed in the eighties, when such
agreements started to be used internationally as an instrument to protect the
domestic economy from international competition, without breaking the GATT
rules. The standard analysis of a VER, in the context of perfectly competitive
markets, identifies three effects: the higher price paid by consumers of the
importing country, the transfer of rents associated with artificially high prices
from the importing to the exporting country, and the lower supply price for
exports, as the marginal revenue product decreases.' It can be shown that the
global welfare loss for a two-country economy as a whole is represented by the
loss in the consumer surplus faced by the importing country, plus the loss in the
producer surplus faced by the exporting country. In an imperfectly competitive
market Harris (1985), Krishna (1989) and Rosendorff (1996) show that a further
effect arises since quantitative restrictions may increase the market power of
some firms. However, their models examine the VER effects on an importing
economy and limit the analysis of the exporting country simply to the firm's
profits. Harris (1985) and Krishna (1989) use a duopoly model with Bertrand
competition and differentiated products in a partial equilibrium setting to show
that a VER induces the domestic firm of the importing country to become an
industry price leader, and therefore obtain the profits of a Stackelberg leader, as
de Melo and Winters (1990) estimate a 9'// fall of the marginal revenue product of
factors employed in the Korean footwear industry leading the industry to contract, as a
consequence of a VER agreement with the US in the period 1977-81. This econometric
finding supports the view that a VER decreases the supply price ol" exports. The
economic effects of VERs are surveyed by Hamilton (1985) and Pomlret (1989).the foreign firm makes the credible commitment that it will not increase the level
of exports when the domestic firm increases its price. Hence, the imposition of a
VER at or close to the free trade level increases prices and profits to both the
domestic and the foreign firms.
2 Rosendorff claims that an exporting country
agrees a VER for fear of antidumping actions or other forms of administered
protection by the importing country.
3
Most of the literature on VERs focuses upon the effect of a VER on an
importing economy. The implication for an exporting country have been mainly
analysed with empirical models, de Melo and Winters (1993), for example, argue
that with a VER the contraction in the restrained industry is associated with
spillovers of exports to unrestricted markets.
4 Applying a partial equilibrium
Harris (1985) argues that the introduction of a VER serves as a collusive focal point for
domestic pricing. Hence, a VER may be an instrument to hold and reinforce the
oligopolistic power of established domestic firms of the importing country, rather than an
instrument for import substitution. The main conclusions of Harris and Krishna's analysis
are that firstly, the imposition of a VER at or close to the free trade level increases prices
and profits to both the domestic and the foreign firms; and secondly, a VER is a welfare
reducing trade policy instrument for the importing country, if the loss in consumer
surplus outweighs the profit gain accruing to the domestic firms of the importing
country. It is important to emphasise that one would expect a loss in national welfare
since domestic consumers also pay for the increase in the foreign firm's profits of the
exporting country.
Rosendorff shows that the government of the importing country prefers a VER to an
optimal tariff if the domestic firm's profits, multiplied by a factor indicating the lobbying
pressure on the government, are greater than the losses in tariff revenues.
However, in a previous study, by investigating the effects of VERs on resource
allocation in the Korean leather footwear industry, de Melo and Winters (1990) estimateeconometric model to the Taiwan footwear industry, they also found that this
country suffered a welfare loss as a consequence of a VER. Trela and Whalley
(1990) report estimates of national and global welfare costs of both developed
country tariffs and bilateral quotas on textiles and apparel using an Applied
General Equilibrium (AGE) model with constant returns to scale. When bilateral
quotas alone are removed, results clearly show that the developed countries and
the vast majority of developing countries gain. Based on 1986 data, the total gain
has been estimated to be of around $ 22 billion. On aggregate, developing
countries gain around $ 3 billion.
5 Similar results for developing countries are
found by Yang (1994) and Yang, et al. (1997).
Francois, et al. (1995), by using various types of multiregional AGE
models characterised by perfect competition, or imperfect competition, or
endogenous capital stock, found that the elimination of the MFA would result in
welfare gains for most of developing countries, and for developing countries as a
whole.
6 In contrast, Harrison, et al. (1997), by using a similar modelling
approach, found that the elimination of the MFA would result in welfare gains for
that the reduction of the industry size is mainly due to the difficulty of switching sales
towards markets which are not constrained by VERs.
In a subsequent study, Trela and Whalley (1995) focus their attention upon the extra
costs on exporting countries of their own internal quota-allocation procedures. Since
quotas are typically allocated to established rather than new and more efficient firms, the
cost of quota restriction in their model is estimated to be $ 23 billion per year compared
to the $ 3 billion without internal quota-allocation schemes.
The main feature of the MFA is the use of bilateral agreements on export quotas to
regulate textiles and apparel trade. VERs are typically agreed so as to limit textiles and
apparel exports from developing countries. Under the MFA, in addition to bilateral
quotas, importing countries also levy non-discriminatory tariffs (Yang, et al. 1997).few countries, and in losses for developing countries as a whole. They argue that
this aggregate welfare loss is due to the transfer of MFA quota rents from
developing to industrialised countries. Only in the long run, after capital stock has
optimally adjusted, do they estimate an aggregate welfare gain for developing
countries as a whole. Similar results have been also obtained by Hertel, et al.
(1995).
These empirical findings support the dominant view that several exporting
countries, especially small countries, are forced, rather than agree voluntarily, to
export restraints.
This paper explores the economic effects of a VER on a foreign supplier
when the VER also modifies the degree of competition in the exporting country's
domestic market, under both Bertrand and Cournot conjectures. I show that the
elimination of a VER certainly leads to a more efficient allocation of resources,
favouring the expansion of the previously restrained industry. However, the
elimination of an export quota causes an increase in the producer price of exports,
which brings about a rise in the composite producer price. The export expansion
and the higher average cost allow less efficient firms to break even. As the
number of the competing symmetric firms within the industry increases, the firms'
perceived elasticity of export demand becomes more elastic. As a result, the
power of incumbent firms declines regardless of the firms' conjectures. However,
the smaller the country, the larger the possibility that the monopoly power in the
domestic market declines more than in the export market. With regard to the
impact on firm size, it positively depends upon the size of export growth for the
industry as a whole, and on the impact on firms' domestic production, and
negatively on the extent of new entry.From the social point of view, I show that the elimination of a VER has
three positive and two negative effects on the welfare of the exporting country.
The positive effects are due to the conventional gains from trade (efficiency
effect); the increase in the producer price of exports, as foreign consumers are
more sensitive to price changes, rather than to quota premium variation (export
producer price effect);
7 and to increased product diversity, as domestic brands
enter in pursuit of positive profits (variety effect). The negative effects on welfare
are due to the loss of the economic rent (rent loss effect), and the greater cost of
purchasing intermediate inputs (increased intermediate inputs cost effect). In
fact, I show that the impact on the costs of intermediate inputs might be
substantial and might be larger than the rise in the producer price of exports. The
impact on the consumer price index, although negligible, cannot be classified
(consumer price effect). Thus, the welfare implications of VERs on an exporting
economy are analytically indeterminate.
In order to comprehend the significance of the analytical results, to
understand better the uncertain outcome on welfare and firm size, and to examine
how sensitive the results are to alternative equilibrium concepts, an AGE model
with the restrained sectors facing increasing returns to scale, identical firms, and
free entry/exit has been built. This model studies the main effects of the
elimination of VERs on welfare, output, resource allocation, average cost, firm
size, concentration of the industry and price cost margin, under both Bertrand and
Cournot conjectures. The model has been applied to the Turkish textiles and
apparel industries, which have been subject to VERs in relation to the European
In models with perfect competition and constant returns to scale, with the elimination of
a VER, the rise in the supply price of exports is due to the fact that the marginal revenue
product rises (de Melo and Winters, 1990).market since 1982 for textiles and 1986 for apparel, and since then periodically
renewed and now broken as a consequence of the recent customs union
agreement (GATT, 1994). The numerical results clearly indicate that regardless
of market conjectures, as a consequence of the elimination of VERs, the
contraction of industry concentration is substantial, whilst it is modest regarding
the negative impact on price cost margins. In addition, it supports the conjecture
that the negative welfare effects dominate the positive effects with trade, thus
decreasing the aggregate welfare of a nation, although by a small amount. It also
confirms the analytical result that the smaller the country the larger the negative
economic implications of the abrogation of VERs for incumbent firms. Similarly,
there is a larger welfare loss for the nation as a whole. The quantitative results are
less sensitive to equilibrium concepts. However, incumbent firms would be worse
off in terms of new entry, size and average cost under Bertrand conjectures, as
they are inherently more competitive. Hence, it seems that industry associations,
with the consent of policy-makers of exporting countries, reach agreements about
VERs for rational economic reasons.
2. A model with imperfect competition and symmetric firms
A VER is an entry barrier in the market for exports. It favours the concentration
of the industry, and allows established firms, especially those which receive the
export licence, to better exploit economies of scale by producing at lower average
cost. Since the break-even price for potential entrants is the average cost, a VER
can also be regarded as an effective entry barrier in the domestic market. Thus,
the voluntary acceptance of export restraints not only generates forms ofoligopoly in the market for exports, but also modifies the degree of competition in
the foreign supplier's domestic market. I model the oligopolistic behaviour of
firms as a noncooperative game, where the stable solution is represented by a
Nash equilibrium in prices or quantities. To justify that, it can be argued that a
VER may facilitate the learning process of each established firm with regard to
the reaction functions of other competing firms, such that each incumbent firm
chooses the amount of output (exported and sold in the domestic market) in order
to maximise its own profit, given the output or the price choice of other
competing firms. So a VER may serve as an institution to protect an established
domestic oligopoly of an exporting country, which behaves in a Cournot or
Bertrand fashion.
The model presented in this section is an intraindustry general equilibrium
model with increasing returns to scale, segmented markets and symmetric firms
used to study the impact of the elimination of a VER on the average cost, the
number of firms, firm size, industrial output, price cost margin and welfare, under
both Bertrand and Cournot conjectures. I also assume the existence of sectors not
subject to VERs, which face perfect competition and constant returns to scale.
The latter sectors are indexed with crs, whilst the sectors subject to VERs are
indexed with /. To represent all sectors of the economy, I use j = i u crs.
To model domestic and foreign trade, I assume that each firm in sector i
and each industry crs employ factors and intermediate inputs to produce two
imperfect substitute goods, one sold in the domestic market and the other
exported. The representative consumer gains utility from the consumption of
domestic goods produced by the industry crs and their imperfect substitute
imports, and from the consumption of a variety of domestic goods produced by
the sectors of differentiated products and a variety of imperfect substitute
10imports. Also the sectoral intermediate demand, which is defined as a Leontief
specification of sectoral output, is satisfied with the supply of domestic goods and
imports.
[2.1] Technology and cost function
The production function of a single representative firm, 0{...}, is additively
separable in O,[...] and O2[...], and such that 3
2©/(3<t>,3<t>2)> 0:
(1) .Vl. =
= 0 if /,. < // or kt < kf
where y, represents composite production of domestic goods and exports; JC;I
denote intermediate inputs, assumed to be net complements; /, and A', represent
labour and capital inputs; and // and kf the fixed factor inputs needed to start
the production process. Due to the presence of fixed setup costs, the production
sets are not-convex. O2 is locally assumed to be twice differentiable, so that
O2 >0 and O2 <0.
The production possibility frontier of each firm is represented by
(2) .y, = Q(d,,et•), Qd > 0, Qe > 0, d^/fidfie,) < 0,
which locally is a separable, differentiable transformation curve of domestic
goods (dj) and exports (f,). The transformation curve is locally assumed twice
differentiable with respect to dj and e-x, such that Q (//,)< 0 and LI (c,-)< 0.
The fixed factor inputs, // and kf, multiplied by their respective returns,
determine the firm's fixed cost. It is important to emphasise the benefits for each
11firm of raising production, as each firm would bear a reduced fixed cost element
per unit of output. The total cost faced by each firm is the sum of variable and
fixed costs, hence the average cost («c,-) to produce one unit of output is
(3) ac; = w/, + rki + £ PjXji />',• >
J )l
where Pj denote the price vector of final and intermediate goods. The factor
demands of each firm and the marginal cost equation can be derived by solving a
standard dual problem. The marginal cost is independent of output, and is a
function of factor prices and sector specific parameters.
The production function and the transformation curve for sectors facing





where Ycrs denotes composite output, Dcrs domestic output, Ecrs exports, Lcn
labour, and Kn.K capital for the industry as a whole. 0"
A is globally linear
homogenous, additively separable in <!>]'" and 0>
c{






rs)>0. Oj" is twice differentiate. Q.
crs is globally linear
homogenous, separable, differentiable and concave.
[2.2] Number affirms
The model is characterised by free entry/exit. One key feature of the model is the
definition of the profit function:
12(6) TT, = pdid; + pea -c,{cl; +ei)-fi,
where 7t, denotes pure profits net of rents from VERs, pd{ the domestic price,
pe{ the producer price of exports, r, the marginal cost and /, fixed costs. It does
not include rents from VERs, because entry in the export market is restricted to
those owning the licence to export. So economic rents can be still made by firms
with the licence to export. In summary, the number of firms is endogenously
determined by the zero profit condition: 7t, = 0.
[2.3] Domestic and foreign demand functions
Armington (1969) argues that goods produced by industries located in different
countries, but which compete in the same market, are imperfect substitute. The
Armington specification is typically a CES function of domestically produced
goods and imports. This approach is very useful to derive the demand for





where Qi is the sum in quantities of final demand (/ ) and intermediate demand
(X,), HR denotes the representative consumer income, pwirij the fixed world
price of imports, (p( a share parameter of the Armington function and e, the











13equilibrium condition in the goods market. The Marshallian demand functions,
/ , are derived by solving a three stages utility maximisation problem, with the
representative consumer facing a convex indifference curve a la Dixit-Stiglitz
(Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). In the first stage, consumers allocate income between
goods which are produced by the differentiated industries; in the second stage,
they allocate income between imports and domestic competing goods; and, in the
third stage, they allocate income between the differentiated domestic products
and the differentiated imports.
An oligopolistic profit maximising firm is characterised by a decreasing
marginal revenue curve in the domestic market as well as in the market for
exports. This implies that domestic demand and export demand ought to be
downward sloping. The solution of the Armington-dual problem leads to the
desired downward sloping domestic demand curve [see (7)], whilst the industry
export demand function ( Et) is assumed negative and isoelastic:
(10) E^Aipwe^',
where pwet is the price paid by foreign consumers for goods under VER, T|, the
absolute value of the foreign price elasticity and A; a positive constant.
8
The Armington specification and an infinitely elastic export demand
function are postulated for sectors facing perfect competition and constant returns
to scale.
Note that the criticism by Whalley and Young (19X4), about the external sector closure
rules in AGE models, does not hold in this modelling framework tor two reasons: firstly,
the exchange rate does not appear in the model; secondly, the foreign import-supply
function is assumed to be infinitely elastic.
14[2.4] Price mark-ups and firms' perceived elasticities
The fact that the domestic market and the export market are segmented implies
that firms maximise (6) with respect to both dx and e,. The profit maximising
conditions result in the Lerner mark-ups formula:
MM-— I = <••,-.
(12) /*?,- — Cj ,
where x, and 5, represent the firm's perceived price elasticities of domestic
demand and export demand, respectively.
Xj can be derived by considering the consumer three-stage budgeting
procedure. To derive 5,, I also assume that a hypothetical foreign consumer
purchases different brands of the industry under VER.
In the third stage of the budgeting procedure, the representative domestic
consumer maximises the following subutility function subject to the budget
devoted to the purchase of domestic goods:
n ~ ~ I
st-
where Pl5 are demand parameters describing the consumer preferences for a
brand s produced by a sector /', dis, which is priced at pdlt; and
15pd,= represents the price index (or unit expenditure
function).
Similarly, the foreign consumer in the purchase of brands subject to a VER
faces the following problem
s E: - s.t.
where y,,
 ar
c demand parameters describing the preferences of the foreign
consumer for a brand s exported by sector /', e\s\ pweis. denote their price, and
pwet is the price of the aggregate, Et.
Utility maximisation implies that the demand for product varieties is a
negative function of the price of the varieties and a positive function of the
aggregate price index. In fact, the first order conditions yield:
(13) Jts = j^DlPd? pdr'',
(14) as = y i}' Eipwe^ pwej
1".
As a result, (10) and (14) imply that £,, > r|(.
As already described in section [2.3], domestic demand and export demand
have different characteristics. Domestic demand is derived by solving a dual
problem, whilst export demand is assumed to be isoelastic. So two different
approaches have been employed to derive x, and 5, under both Cournot andBertrand competition, x, has been obtained following Harrison, et al. (1994),
who in their model employ the Armington specification;
9 whereas 5, has been
obtained following Smith and Venables (1988), where a isoelastic demand
function is postulated. Under both Bertrand and Cournot conjectures, the profit
maximising conditions take the form of (11) and (12). However, if firms
maximise profits given rivals' prices (i.e. Bertrand competition), then x, and 5,
take the form,
(15) x|. = --
06) 8, = -
where
 xVi• = pdlDjipdjD, + pwntjMj) denotes the consumption share for
domestic goods and %, the absolute value of the price elasticity of aggregate
demand.
1
0 If, in contrast, firms maximise profits given rivals' output (i.e. Cournot
competition), then x( and 8, take the form,
(17) ± = -
08)
C £ £
0/ s, «,- Si
1!,-
Harrison, et al. (1994) derive the price elasticity of demand under Cournot conjectures
and under the assumption that the price elasticity of aggregate demand (%,) is unity,
whilst I assume that %, is endogenously specified. The Bcrlrand formula is my
derivation.
See Appendix A for derivation of equations (15)-(18)
17(15)-(18) -show that the larger the absolute value of the price elasticities of
domestic (foreign) demand, or the larger the elasticities of substitution among
domestic (export) varieties, the larger the absolute value of the price elasticity
perceived by firms in the domestic (export) market and, as a result, the lower the
price cost margin in the domestic (export) market. In addition, (15) and (17), and
(16) and (18) provide a formal demonstration that the individual producer faces a
more elastic demand curves with entry, if q( > £• > %, and ^, > TJ,., respectively. It
is also interesting to note that as the number of firms rises, the absolute value of
both price elasticities converges towards the elasticity of substitution among
brands under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. This implies that the impact
of trade policies on the main variables would vary under Cournot and Bertrand
conjectures only with respect to the magnitude of the change. Whereas the
direction of the change of the variables would remain substantially similar.
1
1
[2.5] Rents and the supply price of exports
The policy experiment performed in this study is the evaluation of the impact of
the elimination of a VER, when rents accrue to firms. So I assume that the
industry associations of an exporting country already agreed with an importing
country to restrain their level of exports. This implies that the government does
It is important to stress that a similar conclusion has been drawn by Venables (1994). By
using a multiregional computable partial equilibrium model of trade under imperfect
competition, Venables finds that the gains from an import tariff and an export subsidy are
not significantly sensitive to the change of the equilibrium concept. The equilibrium types
used in his study are the cases of price and quantity competition, segmented markets, and
oligopoly and monopolistic competition.
18not intervene in allocating export licenses and is not the recipient of the rents. The
rents accrue to the private sector, and each firm receives a rent (ver{) which is
equal to the ad valorem quota premium parameter (qr;) times exports, evaluated
at pei:
(19) veri-qripelel





As I am interested in examining the economic implications of the
elimination of VERs, qi) is assumed to be exogenous. When qrt is zero, the rent
disappears and pei = p\vet.
[2.6] Representative household income
The sources of household income are value added, pure profits, plus the
economic rents which originate from sales on foreign markets:
(21) HR = ^{pdjDj + pejEj - PjXJ)+Jjn,Ki + £n.ver, ,
j i i
where the first term represents the value added, that is the value of production
minus the cost of intermediate inputs. In order to study the impact of VERs alone,
it is assumed free entry/exit, so that the number of firms adjusts until pure profits
are zero.
193. Analytical results
[3.1] The impact on the export producer price and the average cost
If the VER agreement is broken and the country can have an impact on its terms
of trade, the immediate effect is a lower level of pwet and an increase of the
demand for exports (10). However, the producer price of exports rises if foreign
consumers are more sensitive to price changes, rather than to ad valorem quota
premium variation. In fact, by using (10) and (20), pel can be written as
(22) pe^A^E-^il + qr^.
By differentiating the latter expression with respect to qrh then
(23) ifa = -Ayita£rVn,(l+ j-^.Vil
where \|/, = -[{\ + qri)/Ei\dEi/dqri. Then, dpejdqr^ <0 if, and only if, r|, >\|/,-.
Since consumers are more sensitive to changes of prices gross of equivalent
taxes, rather than to the variation of the equivalent tax rate itself, I argue that the
elimination of a VER raises the producer price of exports. Obviously, the smaller
the country (that is the larger T|,), the greater the negative impact on pet. In
summary, pex under free trade is greater than its value under VER, but smaller
than pwet under VER.
The composite producer price (/;>',•) is equal to
(24) py^ypd.+jpe,-
20Since qr{ has a secondary impact on pd; and D,, then also py- rises as a
consequence of the VER abrogation. Given the zero profit condition, then,
^ < 0. In summary:
PROPOSITION 1: The elimination of a VER increases the producer price of
exports. The liberalisation process is thus associated with a rise in the average
cost, which is larger, the smaller the country.
[3.2] The impact on the number of firms
The zero profit conditions can be also written as:
(25)
(26) /.
where co, is the absolute value of the price elasticity of domestic demand and A.,
the firms' conjectural variation parameter, which for simplicity is assumed to be
equal in both markets.
1
2 By multiplying (25) by D, and (26) by £,, and
rearranging, the zero profit condition and the assumption that the marginal cost is
independent of output yield
(27) n
fi
Appendix A shows that under Bcrlrand conjectures 0), =£, -(f, -X;)^;- whilst under
Cournot conjectures 0), = [l/e, -(l/e,- - 1/X,)^/] •
21The reduced form for n, is very simple to interpret. Firstly, an expansion of
domestic sales or export sales invites entry; secondly, markets, which are
characterised by a greater price elasticity, fear more competition, than those
characterised by a smaller price elasticity; thirdly, the larger the fixed cost to
produce one unit of output, the smaller the number of firms in equilibrium; finally,
markets, which are characterised by a lower degree of competition (i.e. a larger
A,,), allow a larger number of firms in equilibrium, which cooperate to a certain
extent.
The total differential of (27) with respect to qrl yields







jDj dto, | 1 d(peiEi)
CO, dqr] to; dqr, T], dqt]
Given the secondary impact of qrt on the variables related to domestic production
and domestic consumption, the elimination of a VER, by raising export sales,
determines the entry of new firms: dnjdq^ < 0. So,
PROPOSITION 2: The elimination of a VER raises the number of firms in
equilibrium.
It is important to stress that markets characterised by an infinite demand elasticity
do not determine the number of firms in equilibrium. This feature is important to
explain the empirical finding in section [4.2.1], where a third unrestricted export
market is introduced.
22[3.3] The impact on the price-cost margin
(16) and (18) clearly show that, with the elimination of a VER, as the number of
firms rises, each producer faces a more elastic export demand curve, under both
Cournot and Bertrand competition. This implies that with the elimination of a
VER, the price cost margin in the export market declines. In contrast, the impact
on x, also depends upon the impact on T,- and %,. However, by differentiating
(15)-(18) by qrt, the incumbent firms' power in the domestic market would also





Bertrand conjectures, and if
dn,








under Cournot conjectures. It is clear that, given the curvature of the foreign
consumer's preferences (£,,), the smaller the country (that is, the larger TJ,-) the
greater the possibility that (he price cost margin would fall more in the domestic
market as a result of a VER abrogation.
PROPOSITION 3: The elimination of a VER leads to a fall of incumbent firms'
monopoly power in the export market. The impact on the monopoly power in the
domestic market is ambiguous. However, the smaller the country, the greater
the possibility that the price cost margin would decline more in the domestic
market than in the export market.
23[3.4] The impact on firm size
The impact on firm size is ambiguous. Since dYJdqr, = yi{dnildqri) + ni(dyi/dqri),
and since, by aggregating firms' domestic output and exports, the total derivative
of output for the industry as a whole with respect to qrx is
iIYJdqr, = Ql}(tll),/dqr,) + QE(dEl jdqr^), where QD and D.E respectively denote the
partial derivative of composite production with respect to domestic output and
exports for the industry as a whole, the latter two expressions can be rearranged
as
With the elimination of the quota premium, the first term represents the positive
impact of an export expansion for the industry as a whole. The second term
denotes the negative impact of returns to scale, as a larger number of firms results
in the less efficient exploitation of fixed inputs (note that Q^J,- < y,, if §yd <1,
where § d denotes the elasticity of composite production with respect to
domestic output.).
1
3 Finally, the third term denotes the capability of firms to sell
in the domestic market after new entry is occurred. We expect it to be negative,
since given the domestic demand, a larger number of firms implies a fall in per
firm domestic production. Hence, despite the benefits from export expansion, the
size of incumbent firms might not expand.
Note that Q.odi < _v, implies Qrf/(v,-/J,-)< I.
24PROPOSITION 4: The elimination of a VER raises the size of incumbent firms
if, and only if export expansion outweighs the negative effects of both
inefficiently exploiting economies of scale and of trading in the domestic market.
On the basis of the results on average cost, number of firms, price cost
margin and firm size, which are summarised by the first four propositions,
incumbent firms will lobby the government or industry associations to keep
signing VERs agreements. '"'
[3.5] The impact on the cost of primary and intermediate inputs
The lower price cost margin in the export market is obtainable only if the
marginal cost increase is larger than the rise in the producer price of exports (12).
Since the model assumes the factor inputs to be homogenous among sectors, the
impact on factor returns should not be large. This implies that the rise in the
marginal cost is mainly due to the substantial rise in the intermediate inputs costs.
This finding is very important when I will analyse the VER implication on
welfare in section [3.7].
PROPOSITION 5: The elimination of a VER raises slightly the cost of primary
factor inputs, and substantially the cost of intermediate inputs. The intermediate
inputs cost rise might he larger than the rise in the export producer price.
One might ask why incumbent firms would accept VERs in the first place, if some of
them would exit the market. It could be argued that if export quotas in the first place arc
at, or close to, the free market equilibrium, incumbent firms would rationally welcome
them.
25To prove Proposition 5, it is necessary to subgroup the marginal cost into
two components: the marginal cost related to the primary factor inputs (v() and
the marginal cost related to intermediate inputs (int,). Rearranging (12),
(32)
From Proposition 6, dY,\dqr, <0, which implies that dL,\dqr,<§ and
dK-Jdqt) <(), where ^ =>?,}>,, L, = /;,/,, and /<:, = /!,£,. Consequently,
dVj/dqi) <0. By using the chain rule, dbjdq^ <(dbi/dni)(dn,/dqriy Since
dnjdqr, <0 (from Proposition 2) and dhjdr^ <0, then dbjdqr, >0. The latter
finding, plus the fact that dpe J dqr, <0, imply that dcjdqr, <0. Consequently, if
primary factor inputs are homogenous among sectors and the reduction of qr, just
slightly varies v(, then dinljdqt] <0. In addition, the total differential of (32)
with respect to qr) is
(33)
dqr, dqr,
 L '' "
J dqr, V " " J dqr,




qr, </|5,-| </;;• dpe,
|6,| </<//;. /;e, ^//;
dpe^
dqr,
Since dpe,/dqr, <0 and J|5,|/Jgr, <0, then the first term on the right is positive,
if the export producer price elasticity with respect to qr, is in absolute value
larger that the elasticity of the inverse of the price cost margin in the export
dv (pej-c,)
market with respect to qr,. It <
dqi) qr, (| dqr; pe-, dqr,
then
d'mijdqr, > dpe,j dqr, . In other words, if the cost of primary factor inputs is just
slightly affected, and the fall in the price cost margin in the export market issmaller than the rise in the producer price of exports, the rise in the intermediate
inputs cost would be larger than the rise in the producer price of exports.
[3.6] The impact on output and trade volume
Given the characteristics of the transformation function (2), at industry level
(35) iJUA/G dqi) <hp) ' dqi)
The first term represents the effect on domestic demand, and the second term the
effect on exports. Given the secondary effect on Dl• , and since dEildqrl <0, then
dYjdqr^O.
The trade balance can be written as
(36) £ pwe,E, + £ pensE(,,. - £ pwm; M}.
The derivative of (36) with respect to tp) yields
^ pwt'j dEjdcp) + ^ E; dpwt'i/dq
(37) ' _ '
where, with the elimination of VERs, the first term denotes the positive quantity
effect due to export expansion, the second term denotes the negative terms of
trade effect, the third term represents the negative effect of other sectoral exports,
as resources are reallocated, and the last term denotes the impact on imports.
PROPOSITION 6: The elimination of a VER leads to the growth of a previously
restrained industry. The impact on trade volume is positive if and only if, the
quantity effect dominates the negative terms of trade effect and the negative
effects on other industrial exports.
27These latter two results, easily obtainable with models facing constant
returns to scale, are consistent with the general thinking about the effects of the
elimination of a VER on an exporting country.
[3.7] The impact on welfare
The sign of the welfare change can be measured by the ratio between the change
in indirect utility function and the marginal utility of income, which is equal to the
difference between the change in income (dHR) and the change in the consumer
price index
j
If the numeraire of the model is the Leysperes price index of domestic
goods, the total differential of household income, under the zero profit condition,
yields:
= YJ"\ pd,dd,+ pe,del -Y,Pj





^dnj\ pdidi + peiei ~ V
The sum of the first two terms on the right-hand side represents the global
efficiency gain, as resources are allocated towards a more competitive industry
v[/;;,///?] is the household's indirect utility function, where pt is the price vector of
consumption goods. The total differential of Vl/?;,///?J is
r)j/)j . Using the Roy's identity, the latter
)\ d
L
expression can be written as dV[pJ,HR] = (dV/dHR)
L
quantity demanded.
, where g, is the
28{efficiency effect). The third term represents the gain from an increase in the
producer price of exports, as described by Proposition 1 (export producer price
effect). The fourth term represents the loss from an increase in the cost of
intermediate inputs, as described by Proposition 5 (increased intermediate inputs
cost effect). The fifth term represents the loss from the annulment of the
economic rent (rent loss effect). The last term represents the gains from variety,
as domestic firms enter in pursuit of positive profits, in accordance with
Proposition 2 (variety effect). Hence, the net gain on aggregate welfare is
analytically indeterminate. It is important to stress that the literature on VERs
focuses only on the efficiency effect, the rent loss effect and, to a certain extent,
to the export producer price effect. The variety effect and the increased
intermediate inputs cost effect have been neglected. Since the consumer price
effect is negligible, as the Leysperes price index of domestic goods is assumed
constant and the world price of imports is not affected by the trade policy, then
PROPOSITION 7: The elimination of a VER leads to a welfare gain if and only
if, the efficiency effect, the variety effect and the export producer price effect
outweigh the increased intermediate inputs cost effect and the rent loss effect.
4. An AGE model for Turkey
This section seeks to answer three main questions: Do the qualitative effects
identified in the previous section [3] lead to quantitative aspects of significant
magnitude? Can the analytical ambiguity of the policy effect on some of the
variables, in particular welfare and firm size, be numerically resolved? Is the
29impact of the elimination of a VER sensitive to the type of competition
employed? To answer these fundamental questions, I use an AGE model with the
same features of the analytical model applied to Turkey. This country is a good
test case for two main reasons. Firstly, as a consequence of the recent customs
union agreement with the EU, VERs on Turkish textiles and apparel have been
abolished. Secondly, since the Turkish government does not officially recognise
any quota restriction, VER agreements could only be made with Turkish industry
associations (GATT, 1994). Thus, the rents from VERs accrued to the exporting
firms which were able to obtain the export quota documents for deliveries to the
EU.
The model contains two categories of industries: those where perfect
competition and constant return to scale are assumed to prevail (18 sectors), and




The production function has a two stage nested CES structure. At the first
stage, I assume a Leontief function among primary factors of production and
intermediate inputs, which are in turn assumed to be net complements. At the
second stage, the value added is characterised by constant returns variable costs
with nonsunk setup costs. The elasticity of substitution among the mobile labour
and the mobile capital is assumed to be positive and to vary across industries.
The production possibility frontier has a two stage constant elasticity of
transformation (CET) specification. At the first stage, producers allocate their
production in the domestic market and abroad.
1
7 At the second stage, exports are
The structure of the AGE model is reported in Appendix B.
One properly of the CET specification is that the condili
(13)] is valid for any value of the elasticity of transformation.
One properly of the CET specification is that the condition O.,)di < y, [see footnote
30allocated in the restricted EU market and in the unrestricted rest of the world
(RoW) market. On the demand side, at the first stage, the representative
household's demand and the intermediate demand are satisfied by composite
commodities.
1
8 At the second stage, buyers choose among imports and domestic
goods. At the third and fourth stages, buyers first choose among a variety of
domestically produced goods and a variety of composite imports, and then among
imports from the EU and imports from the RoW, according to the Armington
specification, which states that goods competing in the same market are imperfect
substitutes. The small country assumption is postulated for all traded
commodities, with the exception of textiles and apparel exports to the EU for
which an isoelastic demand curve is supposed.
[4.1] Benchmark and calibration
The theoretical model outlined above and applied to Turkey requires a benchmark
data set to calibrate unknown parameters, such that the observed value of
endogenous variables constitutes an equilibrium of the numerical model. The
main bulk of the data comes from a 1990 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for
Turkey (De Santis and Ozhan, 1995 and 1997), which has been compiled by
using the official 1990 Input-Output Table for Turkey (SIS, 1994). The SAM has
been adjusted in order to extract the rents on exports subject to VERs accruing to
the companies and, then, to households. The activities and commodities are
disaggregated into 20 different types and classified according to the I-O table
classification.
1
8 At the first stage, the utility function is taken to be Cobb-Douglas. This assumption, plus
(9) imply that %, is equal to the ratio between final demand and aggregate demand.
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Source: Data elaboration from SIS (1994).
Dj, Ej and M; arc evaluated in
volumes of domestic sales, exports
billions ol' Turkish lira. So. in this Table, they indicate the
and imports gross of tariffs, respectively.
32Table 1 shows the official statistics related to Turkish production and cost
structure. Table 2 shows the official statistics related to the composition of
demand and trade flows with the EU. According to these official data, the value
of production of Turkish textiles and apparel is 5.5% of total output value, whilst
textiles and apparel export sales comprise 18.5% of total exports. These two
sectors are relatively efficient in Turkey, as the average productivity of labour and
capital is almost double than that recorded by the economy as a whole.
As far as the demand side is concerned, textiles and apparel intermediate
demand comprises 4.6% of total intermediate demand, whilst the budget share of
the representative consumer is equal to 5.6% of his disposable income.
The accounts for imports and exports are disaggregated to model the
relations with the EU and the RoW. The share of imports and exports have been




The export volume of textiles and apparel to the European market is estimated to
be 16.4% of total exports. These summary statistics indicate that the elimination
of VERs in textiles and apparel might have an important impact on the
reallocation of resources within the economy.
Most of the elasticity values have been selected from the existing literature:
the factor substitution elasticities, the Armington trade elasticities, the elasticities
of substitution between imports coming from different regions and the production
possibility frontier's elasticities have been selected from Harrison, et a I. (1992),
and some of them in relation to the sectors facing constant returns to scale have
been adjusted for differences in the aggregation of sectoral output (see Table 3).
The EU is composed of 15 countries: 12 members existing in 1990, plus the new
members Finland, Austria and Sweden.








Leather and fur products-
Footwear
Wood and wood products
Clwmical products





Electricity, gas and waterworks
Construction


















































































































Average 0.375 0.080 0.1 18 0.447 0.556
Source: Data elaboration from SIS (1994) and from an unpublished document of SIS.
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0,: elasticity of substitution among primary factors of production; £,: elasticity of
substitution between imported and domestically produced goods; (Iy : elasticity of substitution
among imports from different regions; p,: elasticity of transformation between production for
exports and the domestic market; G3 : elasticity of transformation among exports to different
regions.
35The smaller export demand elasticities for the sectors facing increasing returns to
scale (see Table 4) have been chosen from Dervis, et at. (1982). The elasticity of
substitution between domestic brands and brands to be exported have been
chosen exogenously, such that they are respectively larger than the elasticity of
substitution between domestic goods and imports, and the export demand
elasticity. The fact that the calibrated price elasticity of aggregate demand are less
than one in both sectors implies that <;,->£,-> %,-. As a result, the individual
producer will face a more elastic demand curve with entry. The ad valorem quota
premium have been selected from Trela and Whalley (1990). The economic rents
from VERs are equal to 0.5% of total household's revenues.
In order to calibrate the variables of sectors facing increasing returns to
scale, the algebraic structure of the model required further information on price-
cost margins, fixed costs and the number of symmetric firms at sectoral level.
These data are not easily collectable. However, the 1990 SAM for Turkey
classifies labour in 8 different labour categories. I assume that three categories,
represented by "professional workers", "administrative and managerial workers",
and "clerical workers" comprise the fixed amount of labour required to have the
plant open. According to the SAM's estimates, the fixed labour cost in textiles
and apparel is almost 20% of total labour force. With regard to the capital stock,
the Istanbul Chamber of Industry (1991) published some statistical information on
the largest 500 industries in Turkey. Using this statistical source, the fixed capital
stock, represented by capital depreciation, interest payments and rents, has been
estimated to be equal to 15% of total sales in both textiles and apparel. The
number of firms has been chosen exogenously; whereas the price cost margins in
both domestic and foreign markets have been calibrated within the model, with
their value depending upon the adopted conjectures.
36Table 4 Data for the imperfectly competitive sectors
SECTORS Textiles Apparel
Elasticity of substitutions among domestic brands
Elasticity of substitutions among exported brands
Export demand elasticity (small)
Export demand elasticity (high)
Price elasticity of aggregate demand
Number of firms
Ad valorem quota premium
Fixed labour cost (I)
Fixed capital cost (2)
Price cost margin for domestic goods (Bertrand)
Price cost margin for exports (Rertrand - T\i —2)
Price cost margin for exports (Rertrand - T|( = 5 )
Price cost margin for domestic goods (Cournot)
Price cost margin for exports (Cournot - T](- =2)






























(1) The fixed labour cost is a share of the total labour cost.
(2) The fixed capital cost is a share of total sales.
37The price cost margin in the Bertrand case is smaller, because Bertrand
conjectures are inherently more competitive (see Table 4).
Table 4 shows that the additional data needed to calibrate equations with
imperfect competitive features are assumed to be similar in both sectors. This
assumption is not a fallacy of the numerical model. On the contrary, since the ad
valorem quota premium in apparel is double that in textiles, the empirical findings
will help us in understanding the relation between the impact on sectoral variables
and the size of the binding quota.
As the analytical model, the AGE model assumes free entry/exit. Hence,
the benchmark generates a long run reference equilibrium by setting pure profits
to zero. This reference equilibrium is then the basis for comparison in
counterfactual trade policy analysis.
[4.2] The elimination ofVERs scenarios
[4.2.1] The impact on Turkish industry and incumbent firms' variables
The equilibrium concepts employed in this paper are Nash equilibria in prices
(i.e. Bertrand competition) or quantities (i.e. Cournot competition). Tables 5-8
report the numerical results of the elimination of VERs on Turkish textiles and
apparel respectively under Cournot and Bertrand conjectures in two different
cases, assuming the price elasticity of the export demand in these two sectors to
be equal to 2 and 5. In this way, the sectoral results of the policy scenarios can be
compared under alternative Nash equilibria, and under different hypothesis
regarding the size of the country and the size of the quota premium.
38Table 5: The impact of the elimination of VERs on aggregate variables
(Cournot - Base year = 100)
Turkey's social welfare
Aggregate output in real terms
Trade volume
Consumer price index












It is clear that the numerical results are fully consistent with the analytical
findings, which are unambiguous. The elimination of VERs brings about a large
increase of sectoral exports to the EU, both in terms of total exports and exports
per firm. The large impact on textiles and apparel exports to the EU raises output
in both industries quite remarkably in accordance with Proposition 6, and
expands trade volume under both forms of competition. The producer price of
exports to the EU is also positively affected in accordance with Proposition 1.
The possibility of making profits allows less efficient firms to break even in
accordance with Proposition 2 (see Tables 6 and 8). The number of firms
increases by 7.3% (12.9%) in textiles and 6.1% (4%) in apparel in the Cournot
case, and by 8.3% (13.7%) in textiles and 7.3% (5.9%) in apparel in the Bertrand
case.
39Table 6: The impact of the elimination of VERs at sectoral and firm level
(Cournot - Base year = 100)
Textiles Apparel Textiles Apparel
- At sectoral level




Export sales to the EU
Export sales to the RoW
Price elasticity of domestic demand
- At firm level
Output
Domestic output
Exports to the EU


































- Prices and costs
Producer price of exports to the EU
Average cost
Marginal cost
Primary factor inputs cost
Intermediate inputs cost
Price cost margin in the domestic market (1)
Price cost margin in the EU market (2)

























40The zero profit condition is once again restored if the average cost rises in
accordance with Proposition 1. In the Cournot case, the average cost rises by
2.6% (7.6%) in textiles and 4.7% (9.3%) in apparel. Whereas in the Bertrand
case, it rises by 3.3% (9%) in textiles and 5.3% (10.4%) in apparel.
It is interesting to note that although, in accordance with Proposition 1,
there is a unique positive relation between size of quota premium, or size of the
country, and average cost, a similar relation between size of quota premium, or
size of the country, and number of firms does not occur. This is because the
impact on the number of firms is also a function of domestic sales and of the price
elasticity of domestic demand [(see (28)]. In fact, Tables 6 and 8 show that
although the quota premium in textiles is half that in apparel, new entry is larger
in textiles, because the VERs abrogation reduces the price elasticity of domestic
demand and has a positive impact on domestic sales. I should stress that the
impact on the export sales to the RoW does not affect the number of firms,
because the RoW faces an infinitely elastic demand function. A similar
conclusion can be drawn with respect to the size of the country.
As far as the form of competition is concerned, the impact on both average
cost and new entry is larger under Bertrand conjectures, as they are inherently
more competitive. Similarly, the ex-post size of firms is smaller under Bertrand
competition. This implies that incumbent firms will prefer the status quo
especially under a price setting oligopoly. However, it must be stressed that the
difference between the numerical results obtained under Bertrand and Cournot
conjectures is small.
41Table 7: The impact of the elimination of VERs on aggregate variables
(Bertrand - Base year = 100)
Turkey's social welfare
Aggregate output in real terms
Trade volume
Consumer price index












So despite the significance of the quantitative results, they are less sensitive to
equilibrium concepts, as already described by Venables (1994) for the case of an
import tariff and an export tax. This is because as the number of firms rises, the
price cost margins in the domestic and export markets converge towards the same
value (that is, the inverse of the elasticity of substitution among brands) under
both conjectures.
Entry leads to a modest decline of the price cost margin in both markets.
Another important empirical result is in relation to the ratio between the price
cost margins in the domestic and export markets. Given the elasticity of
substitution among exported brands, the smaller the country, the greater the loss
of monopoly power in the domestic market with respect to the export market [see
(29) and (30)] in accordance with Proposition 3.
42Table 8: The impact of the elimination of VERs at sectoral and firm level
(Bertrand - Base year = 100)
- At sectoral level




Export sales to the EU
Export sales to the RoW
Price elasticity of domestic demand
- At firm level
Output
Domestic output
Exports to the. EU
Exports to the RoW
- Prices and costs
Producer price of exports to the EU
Average cost
Marginal cost
Primary factor inputs cost
Intermediate inputs cost
Price cost margin in the domestic market (1)
Price cost margin in the EU market (2)

















































































43The full employment assumption of factor inputs implies a reallocation of
resources among sectors. Thus, despite the increase of factor inputs demand in
textiles and apparel, wage and rental rates characterising the whole of the
economy are only slightly affected in accordance with Proposition 5. Hence, if
the cost of primary factor inputs rises slightly, and the fall in the price cost margin
in the export market is smaller that the rise in the producer price of exports, then
the cost of intermediate inputs has to increase substantially, and at a higher rate
than the rise in the producer price of exports to the EU, for the price cost margin
in the export market to decline in accordance with Proposition 5.
Despite output growth, output per firm might expand or decline in
accordance with Proposition 4, depending positively on the size of export
expansion, which is obviously larger in apparel, and negatively on both the
number of new entrants, which is larger in textiles, and the domestic output fall,
which is larger in apparel.
A further important empirical result is in relation to the impact on firms'
domestic output. All scenarios show that despite the large spillovers of exports
from the RoW, firms record a domestic output contraction, which is larger, the
smaller the country.
These numerical results support the conjecture that a VER is a good
instrument to prevent entry and to protect the monopoly power of incumbent
firms in both the domestic and the export markets, either in a quantity-setting or
in a price-setting oligopoly.
44[4.2.2] The impact on Turkey's social welfare
The measure of the welfare change in AGE literature is the Hicksian equivalent
variation. To be consistent with the analytical model, the representative
household faces a convex indifference curve a la Dixit-Stiglitz, which is taken to
be Cobb-Douglas at the first stage, and CES form at the second, third and fourth
stages. Income distribution issues are neglected, hence the representative
consumer's utility function can be regarded as representing the Samuelsonian
social indifference curves, which takes the following form:
09) w = l}[cj" ]n[/,
r)' ], X vm + ]>>, = i,
crs i
where $j represents the household's consumption shares, Ccrs denotes the
individual's consumption of commodities produced by industries facing constant
returns to scale, and /, can be regarded as the Dixit-Stiglitz quantity index of
aggregate consumption of the industry output of differentiated products. Ccrs is
derived by maximising the subutility function subject to the money income spent
on commodities produced by the industries facing constant returns to scale.
Given the assumption that domestic production and imports satisfies both
household consumption and the intermediate demand of the industry [see (9)], /,
takes the form,
(40) /.• =
where %,, the price elasticity of aggregate demand, is equal to the share of
household consumption in the total demand of goods produced by industries
facing increasing returns to scale.
Given the symmetry assumption among firms, the utility gained from the
consumption of domestic goods and imported products can be written as:
45(41) £>,- =n,.*
(42, M, =n:\ (H]
where «"' represents the fixed number of competing foreign brands, mf
u and
mf
nW denote respectively the EU and the RoW representative firms' sale to the
market of the exporting country, cli is the elasticity of substitution among
imported varieties, (I, is the elasticity of substitution among imports from
different regions, and i, is a share parameter of the import aggregation function.
m should properly be treated as an endogenous variable. However, the model
presented in this study is a single country open economy model. It is therefore
difficult to model the product selection process in foreign industries.
2
0
In examining the economic implications for Canada of the North-America free trade
agreement, Harris (1984) assumes that the number of imported variety of a product is in
a constant ratio to the number of domestically produced varieties. However, this
assumption implies that as the number of domestic firms decreases with the elimination
of tariffs, the number of competing foreign varieties is also reduced. In contrast, it is
generally accepted that product variety rises with trade. Thus, the welfare gains of tariff
liberalisation in the presence of product differentiation would be underestimated. As far
as the effect of a VER on n? is concerned, it can be argued that the ad valorem quota
premium is equivalent to an ad valorem tariff rate for the importing country. Its
elimination might produce the same results discussed in Harris (1984), where the
elimination of tariffs imposes a downward pressure on price mark-ups in manufacturing
industries and forces the less efficient firms to exit in response to losses. Thus, fixing m
exogenously might overestimate the welfare effect of the elimination of a VER. It is
likely that only a multircgional model might attempt to explicitly model both domestic
and foreign brands, and in this way examine the welfare effect of trade policies in the
46Tables 5 and 7 show that, as a consequence of the elimination of VERs, the
impact on welfare, though small, is negative. Social welfare decreases by a factor
of 0.6 (1.1) as a percentage of consumer income in 1990 in both forms of
competition. Given the fact that the consumer price index is not affected, the
social welfare loss indicates that the rent loss effect and the increased
intermediates input cost effect dominate the positive effects from trade. It also
seems that the smaller the country, the larger the welfare loss of the elimination of
VERs, although the efficiency gains (represented by the rise of aggregate output
in real terms), the gains from variety, and from the rise in the export producer
price, are much larger. Thus, since the loss of the economic rent and the
consumer price index are equal in all scenarios, it is reasonable to suggest that the
increased intermediate inputs cost effect is an important negative effect, which
might determine the size of the welfare loss in the exporting country. In fact, the
computed estimates show that the intermediate inputs cost index rises quite
remarkably, when the country faces a more elastic foreign demand curve.
In summary, if policy-makers of exporting countries might accept VERs
agreements in order to improve the welfare of their nations, industry associations
voluntarily agree to restrain their level of exports in order to limit entry of other
potential firms. This allows incumbent firms to better exploit economies of scale,
capture rents and protect their monopoly power in both domestic and export
market.
presence of" product differentiation. In this study, m is assumed to be equal to the
benchmark value of nt, and c,: is assumed to be equal to c,,•..
475. Conclusions
This paper analyses the possible consequences of VERs on an exporting country
when firms facing increasing returns to scale behave either in a Cournot fashion
or with Bertrand conjectures. I show that the elimination of a VER raises the
average cost to produce one unit of output, and this effect is larger, the smaller
the country. It decreases the concentration of the industry and the price cost
margins in the export market. The impact on firm size is ambiguous. In addition, I
show that the smaller the country, the greater the possibility of a relative lower
price cost margin in the domestic market, as a result of a VER abrogation. This
implies that incumbent firms have interest in renewing VERs in order also to
protect their monopoly power in the domestic market. The analytical effect on
social welfare is indeterminate: the positive effect comes from the positive impact
of trade liberalisation upon exports (efficiency effect); the increased product
diversity, as the number of symmetric firms rises (variety effect); and from the
increase of the producer price of exports, as foreign consumers are more sensitive
to price changes rather than to ad valorem quota premium variation (export
producer price effect); whilst the negative effect comes from the loss of the
economic rent (rent loss effect), and from the rise in the intermediate inputs cost
(increasing intermediate inputs cost effect). The latter effect is very important, as
a fall in the price cost margin in the export market can be achieved only if the
cost of purchasing intermediate inputs rises substantially.
An AGE model with increasing returns to scale, segmented markets and
free entry/exit, applied to the Turkish textiles and apparel industries, indicates
that the analytical results are quantitatively interesting, under both Bertrand and
Cournot competition, and seems to support the conjecture that an exporting
48country is better off under a VER, as the rent loss effect and the intermediate
inputs cost effect dominate the positive effects from trade. The numerical model
indicates that the smaller the exporting country, the larger the welfare loss. Given
the facts that the consumer price index is not affected, and the loss of economic
rents is equal in all three scenarios, and since the export producer price effect,
the variety effect and the efficiency effect are negatively related to the size of the
exporting country, it is reasonable to suggest that the increased intermediate
inputs cost effect explains much of the welfare loss in an exporting country.
The numerical results also indicate that the contraction of firms' domestic
output is large, whilst the impact on price cost margins is modest. In addition,
they show that the rise in both the average cost and the number of new entrants is
larger under Bertrand conjectures, as they are inherently more competitive.
Similarly, the size of the firms is smaller. This implies that especially industries
characterised by more competitive conjectures will lobby government or industry
associations to keep renewing VERs agreements. However, the quantitative
difference of the impact of the elimination of VERs under Bertrand and Cournot
conjectures is small, which implies that the impact of this policy is less sensitive
to equilibrium concepts.
A possible loss in social welfare and the fall of monopoly power of
incumbent firms in both domestic and export markets are the key elements to
understanding why exporting countries voluntarily agree to restrain their level of
exports.
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53Appendix A Price elasticities in Bertrand and Cournot
[A.I ] Derivation of firms' perceived elasticity of domestic demand
An industry / faces an aggregate demand function which is represented by (7). If
domestic goods are produced by symmetric firms, they can be treated as
imperfect substitutes. Thus, the aggregate domestic demand at the third stage of
the demand tree can be written as
(Al)
n ~ ~
where <;,-, is the elasticity of substitution among n domestic varieties, diS; and |3/5
are demand parameters describing the consumer preferences for a brand s
produced by sector i.






[A.J.I] Derivation of (15)
(A2) can be log-linearised as
(A3) In dis - <;, In pfj+ In D, + q, In pd; - q, In pdis
54By definition the derivative of (A3) with respect to In pdh yields the firms'
perceived price elasticity of domestic demand (x,):
,A^ d\x\Dt d\npd;
(A4) X; = ^r- + <;,. '•Z-
L- - q..
d\npdis d\npdis
7\ I ~ ~ ~?















dD; dpd; paf/v dis pd; dD;
d;D; D; dpd;
(A6) ^
lnM = /^^,, d*
d\npdls P
di°i
Given the symmetry assumption, (A6) and (A5) into (A4) yield
pd: dD:
(A7) x,-= ?/ + VH~7
By applying similar steps at the second stage of the demand tree, then
where M^- denotes the consumption share for domestic goods and %, the absolute
value of the price elasticity of aggregate demand.
(A8) into (A7) yields (15).
[A. 1.2] Derivation of (17)
The inverse demand function of (A2) is
55(A9) In pdis = In Pis + — In D, In dis +
By definition the derivative of (A9) with respect to In dis yields the inverse
of x,-:
(A10) 1 = 1 d\nDt 1 | dlnpd,
x> ^ dlndis Si d\ndis
Since under Cournot conjectures —^ = $js D/
/q'' dis , and since from
ddis
(A2) p,, D^d-
l/- = pdjpd, , then
, _pdlsdis
- T
Since, by using the chain rule, ^ = z:—, then
pdisdls D, (A12) _ ^ .
d\nd,s MA pd, 3D,-
Given the symmetry assumption, (A12) and (All) into (AlO) yield
(A.3) ±=-I + ±(l3
By applying similar steps at the second stage of the demand tree, then
(A14)
pd, 3D,. e,. ^e,
(A 14) into (A 13) yields (17).
56[A.2] Derivation of firms' perceived elasticity of foreign demand
Assume that a representative foreign consumer gains utility by the following two







Z,; is the elasticity of substitution among n exported brands, eis\ and yis are
demand parameters describing the preferences of the foreign consumer for a
brand s exported by sector /'.
The first order conditions yield the lower level demand:
(A17) els = yj ^ ^
where pwe, -
[A.2.1] Derivation of (16)
By using (A15), (A17) can be log-linearised as
(A18) =£, \nyis+\nAl
By definition the derivative of (A 18) with respect to \npweis yields the
firms' perceived price elasticity of foreign demand (5,):
(A19) S( = ft,-n,)-!to--$,.
d\n pweif
57Since under Bertrand conjectures dpwejdpwejs =\yis pwejpweis
then








Given the symmetry assumption (A21) into (A19) yields (16).
In addition, by using (A 15) and (A17), since






[A.2.2] Derivation of (18)
By using (A15), (A17) can be log-linearised as
(A22) In pweis = In yis + \ In E, - — In e,.
T\ J Si
By definition, the derivative of (A22) with respect to Inez* yields the
inverse of 5,:
(A23) > f> ±te 5
dine ^
Since under Cournot conjectures 3£,•/ d e-,x - yJ E-J eis , then
(A24) — = Y-
~ I 1.5 d In e is
58In addition, by using (A15) and (A17), since





Given the symmetry assumption, (A25) into (A23) yields (18).
59Appendix B Numerical model: the case of VERs
This appendix reports the algebraic formulation of the numerical model employed
to study the economic impact of the elimination of the VERs in Turkish textiles
and apparel. The appendix has been split into six sections: (i) equations related to
prices and costs; (ii) equations related to production and factor demand; (iii)
equations related to domestic and foreign trade; (iv) equations related to income;
(v) equations related to final demand and intermediate demand; (vi) equations
related to the market clearing conditions.
[B. I] Price and cost equations
(Bl) P^
(B2) pyj^JJ




(B4) pnijMj = pwm. MJ
U + pwrnf M/
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[B.2] Production and factor demand equations
(B16)
(B17)






































(B32) V67- =qnpe, E,
/TJQO^ f-IR ... r /in i ../^ A n . X ' „ _ , X ' EU
[B.5] Intermediate and final demand equations




[B.6] Market clearing conditions
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Private demand of goods
Aggregate capital stock
Demand for domestic commodity
Domestic commodities demanded in the base year
Exports
Exports to the EU
Exports to the EU in the base year







u Imports from the EU
Mf
oW Imports from the RoW
n, Number of firms
Pj Price of the final and the intermediate good
pd • Price of the domestic good in the base year
pdj Price of domestically produced commodity
pvj Value added price
py j Aggregate producer price
r-iy
p\vet Price of exports to the EU
pwe't'
u Price of exports to the EU
RoW
pwe • Price of exports to the RoW
EU
pwm Price of imports from the EU
RoW
pwm- Price of imports from the RoW
Qj Composite commodity
r Return to capital
Xj Intermediate demand
)', Output per domestic firm
Ycrs Output by the industry
w Wage
X, Price elasticity of aggregate demand
65Xj World price of similar exported goods
Kj Profit per firm
A Numeraire
vVi Share of consumption of domestic goods in total consumption
Parameters (*):
cijj Leontief input-output coefficients.
k( Fixed amount of capital per firm
// Fixed amount of labour per firm
v, Conjectural variation shift parameter
oty Share parameter in the second nest CET function
Py Share parameter in the CET aggregation function
5, Firm perceived elasticity in the export market
Ej Elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic goods
cp; Share parameter in the Armington trade aggregation function
y j Share parameter in the CES production function
iy Share parameter in the second nest Armington function
T|; Price elasticity of export demand
CDy Elasticity in the second nest CET function
fly Household budget shares
Pj Elasticity in the CET aggregation function
Oy Elasticity of substitution among primary factors of production
66x,- Firm perceived elasticity in the domestic market
£,, Elasticity of substitution among exported brands
£,- Elasticity of substitution among domestic brands
Aj Shift parameter in the second nest Armington function
Aj Shift parameter in the Armington trade aggregation function
Tj Shift parameter in the second nest CET function
Qj Shift parameter in the CES production function
Qj Shift parameter in the CET aggregation function
(*) Parameter and variables with a bar are set exogenously. crx and / denote sectors facing
constant and increasing returns to scale, respectively {J' = crs LJ /).
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